Adhyāya III — Sādhana

The passageThe pañcāgni-vidyā of Chāndogya 5.3–10 and Bṛhadāraṇyaka 6.2.

The questionWhen the soul leaves the body, does it go bare, or does it carry something with it?

ConclusionIt departs enveloped in subtle elements — designated ‘water’ in the texts, since water predominates in the seed of a future body. These subtle constituents are the vehicle of the karmic residue and the seed of the next embodiment. Without them the doctrine of the five fires, in which the soul is successively offered in heaven, rain, earth, man and woman, would have nothing to be offered.

The passageChāndogya 5.10.5 — ‘having dwelt there as long as the residue lasts, they return by the same path’.

The questionDoes the soul in the lunar world exhaust its karma entirely, or return with a remainder?

ConclusionA residue ( anuśaya ) remains. What is exhausted is the particular store of merit that earned that world; the balance of accumulated karma determines the character of the return — through ākāśa, wind, smoke, mist, cloud, rain, plants, food and seed.

The passageChāndogya 5.10.8 — the ‘third place’, and Kaṭha's account of Naciketas.

The questionWhat of those whose deeds do not earn the moon at all?

ConclusionNot all go to the moon. Those whose conduct has been evil pass to the realm of Yama, undergo suffering there, and afterwards return; and there is a ‘third place’ — the small creatures who are continually born and die. Passages that appear to send all souls to the moon speak of those qualified by ritual works.

The passageThe soul's identification with the stages of its descent.

The questionWhen the texts say the soul becomes ether, becomes mist, becomes rain, does it literally turn into these?

ConclusionIt attains a likeness to them, being conditioned by them in passing, as one is said to become fire on entering a furnace. Real transformation into an element would be the soul's destruction.

The passageThe duration of the descent.

The questionHow long does the passage through the stages take?

ConclusionThe passage is quick. The stages are traversed without significant delay, as scripture indicates by the manner of its description.

The passageThe soul in plants and in food.

The questionWhen the soul enters rice or barley, and then a body through food, does it experience the life of the plant?

ConclusionIt merely dwells in them without becoming their enjoyer, since those bodies are governed by other souls. The connection is one of association only, and no fresh karma is incurred.

The passageBṛhadāraṇyaka 4.3 — the state ‘between’, that is, dream.

The questionIs the dream world a real creation?

ConclusionDream is māyā-mātra , mere appearance. It lacks the completeness of a real creation — there are no materials, no time, no space adequate to it — and it is sublated on waking. The creative language marks the vividness of the appearance, not its ontological status.

The passageChāndogya 8.6.3 — the soul in deep sleep resting in the nāḍīs and in Brahman.

The questionWhere does the soul go in dreamless sleep?

ConclusionIt rests in Brahman, reaching it by way of the nāḍīs and the heart; the different statements name the route and the destination, not rival destinations. There is no dissolution, for the same person returns.

The passageThe return from deep sleep.

The questionIs it the same soul that wakes, or another?

ConclusionThe same soul returns, for four reasons: its karma is unexhausted, memory continues, scripture says ‘whatever these creatures are, they return again’, and injunctions presuppose a persisting agent.

The passageSwoon.

The questionIs fainting a fourth state, or one of the three already known?

ConclusionIt is a partial state, half-way to death — the soul retains its connection with the body but the ordinary functions are suspended. It is not a distinct fourth state alongside waking, dream and sleep.

The passageThe two sets of texts: those ascribing form and attributes to Brahman, and those denying them.

The questionDoes Brahman have form and qualities, or not?

ConclusionBrahman is in truth formless and without attributes. The passages ascribing form are for the sake of meditation; the negating passages — neti neti — state the reality. Not even a shadow of imperfection touches Brahman, and where texts appear to admit one, the reference is to Brahman as conditioned by adjuncts.

The passageBṛhadāraṇyaka 2.3.6 — ‘not this, not this’.

The questionDoes ‘neti neti’ deny Brahman itself?

ConclusionIt denies the two forms of Brahman just described — the gross and the subtle — not Brahman. What is negated is every form ascribed; what remains is the one to whom nothing can be ascribed. The passages of non-difference then state positively what negation has cleared.

The passagePassages speaking of a ‘bridge’, of what is beyond, and of what is higher.

The questionIs there anything higher than Brahman?

ConclusionThere is nothing beyond. Such expressions serve meditation and mark Brahman as what separates the released from saṁsāra, not as a stage on the way to something else. Brahman is known by śruti alone and is not to be reached by any further step.

The passageThe source of the fruit of action.

The questionDoes the fruit of an action come from the action itself, or from the Lord?

ConclusionBādarāyaṇa holds that the fruit comes from the Lord, who dispenses according to works. An insentient potency cannot allot fruits appropriately, and scripture speaks of the Lord as the giver. Karma determines what is deserved; the Lord determines that it is received.

The passageThe same vidyā recorded in different śākhās.

The questionWhen two branches of the Veda teach a meditation with the same form, is it one vidyā or two?

ConclusionOne. Where the object, the form and the fruit are the same, the vidyā is one, and difference of recension does not divide it. The same principle Pūrva-mīmāṁsā applies to sacrificial acts applies here.

The passageThe combination of attributes across recensions.

The questionIf the vidyā is one, are the attributes given in one branch to be brought into the meditation as taught in another?

ConclusionYes. Since the vidyā is one, its attributes wherever recorded belong to it, and the meditator combines them.

The passageThe Udgītha-vidyā of the Chāndogya and of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka.

The questionAre these two Udgītha meditations the same vidyā?

ConclusionThey are distinct. In one the meditation is on the syllable, in the other on the prāṇa within the Udgītha; the objects differ, and so the details are not transferred. Sameness of name is not sameness of vidyā.

The passageChāndogya 1.1.1 — ‘let a man meditate on the syllable Oṁ as the Udgītha’.

The questionIs this Oṁ restricted to the Sāman, or common to all the Vedas?

ConclusionOṁ pervades all the Vedas and is common to them; the meditation is on Oṁ as such, and the Udgītha context specifies the occasion, not the object.

The passageThe prāṇa-vidyā in several recensions.

The questionIs the meditation on prāṇa the same in all branches?

ConclusionIt is one, and the qualities taught in each place are to be combined, since the object and the fruit are the same throughout.

The passageAttributes such as bliss and knowledge, and attributes such as ‘the head is joy’.

The questionWhich attributes of Brahman are to be gathered into every meditation, and which are not?

ConclusionEssential attributes — bliss, knowledge, existence — belong to Brahman's nature and enter every meditation on Brahman. Attributes belonging to particular meditations, such as having joy for a head, or having the worlds for a body, remain confined to those meditations.

The passageKaṭha 1.3.10 — ‘beyond the senses are the objects, beyond the objects the mind…’.

The questionIs this a statement of the order of creation, or an instruction for meditation?

ConclusionIt is for meditation: a ladder of successive interiorisation by which the mind is drawn from the outer to the inner and finally to the puruṣa. Read as cosmology it would conflict with the established order.

The passageAitareya 1.1 — ‘the Self alone was this in the beginning’.

The questionIs the Self referred to here the Supreme, or Hiraṇyagarbha?

ConclusionThe Supreme, since the passage is introduced by the marks of Brahman and since the same Self is what one is instructed to know.

The passageThe rinsing of the mouth mentioned in the prāṇa-vidyā.

The questionIs the ācamana there a new injunction, or a reference to a known act?

ConclusionIt is a reference to an act already enjoined elsewhere, mentioned for the sake of the meditation, not a fresh command.

The passageMeditations identical in form across recensions.

The questionAre such meditations one?

ConclusionThey are one where object and fruit coincide, and their details combine.

The passageThe Śāṇḍilya-vidyā of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and its two forms.

The questionDo the attributes of these two forms combine?

ConclusionThe two are distinguished, and the attributes of the one are not carried into the other; but attributes belonging to Brahman as such do apply to both.

The passageAttributes of ‘supporting’ found in the Rāṇāyanīya text.

The questionAre these to be transferred into other meditations on Brahman?

ConclusionThey are not transferred, being tied to their own meditation and not among Brahman's essential attributes.

The passageThe puruṣa-vidyā of the Chāndogya and of the Taittirīya.

The questionAre these one vidyā?

ConclusionThey differ: in one the man is imagined as a sacrifice, in the other differently. The details are not combined.

The passageDetached mantras prefixed to certain Upaniṣads, such as ‘he pierced’.

The questionAre these part of the meditations that follow?

ConclusionThey belong to the ritual and are not part of the vidyā; proximity alone does not establish connection.

The passageThe shaking off of good and evil at the time of release.

The questionIs the abandoning of merit and demerit one act, or two, since the texts state them variously?

ConclusionIt is one occurrence: where only one is mentioned, the other is implied, since both must go for release. The statements complete one another.

The passageThe time at which the knower's works fall away.

The questionWhen does the abandonment of works take place?

ConclusionAt the time of departure — the works fall away as the soul sets out, and what follows is unimpeded. Some texts place it at the entry into the path for this reason.

The passageThe purpose of the path of the gods.

The questionIf the knower's works are gone, of what use is the journey?

ConclusionThe path is meaningful for the meditator on the qualified Brahman, who reaches the world of Brahman and attains release in due course. It is not for the knower of the unqualified, for whom there is no departure at all.

The passageThe scope of the path.

The questionDoes the path of the gods belong only to those meditating on certain vidyās?

ConclusionIt applies to all meditators on the qualified Brahman, wherever the meditation is recorded.

The passageKnowers who remain embodied.

The questionIf knowledge destroys the cause of embodiment, why do some knowers continue to live and act?

ConclusionThose charged with a particular office in the world — teachers, seers, those with a mission — remain embodied until it is discharged, their remaining karma being spent in it. Apāntaratamas and Vasiṣṭha are cited.

The passageNegative attributes stated in different texts.

The questionAre the various negations — not gross, not subtle, not short, not long — to be combined?

ConclusionThey are combined, since they all serve the single purpose of removing every ascription from the same Brahman.

The passageBṛhadāraṇyaka 4.4.14 — ‘so much indeed is immortality’.

The questionDoes this identify the vidyā just taught with all others?

ConclusionIt refers to the particular meditation in its own context; the vidyās remain distinguished.

The passageThe dialogues of Uṣasta and of Kahola in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka.

The questionDo these two teach the same self?

ConclusionThey teach one and the same inner self, and the two passages constitute one vidyā; the difference of wording answers the difference of the questioners.

The passageReciprocal meditations — the self as the deity, and the deity as the self.

The questionIs such a meditation to be practised in one direction only, or in both?

ConclusionBoth directions are to be practised, since the texts state both and each has its own effect.

The passageThe attribute ‘true’ (satya) in the meditations on the person in the sun and in the eye.

The questionDo these attributes combine?

ConclusionThe attributes belong to Brahman and combine, the loci being distinct only for the sake of meditation.

The passageThe dahara-vidyā as taught in the Chāndogya and in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka.

The questionDo the attributes of the one enter the other?

ConclusionThey are one vidyā, and the attributes are combined.

The passageThe prāṇāgnihotra — the offering of food to the vital breaths.

The questionIs this to be performed when the ordinary agnihotra has been performed, and is it obligatory?

ConclusionBādarāyaṇa holds that it is not to be omitted, the texts showing that it has its own standing and its own effect.

The passageMeditations connected with particular sacrificial acts.

The questionAre such meditations fixed to those acts?

ConclusionThey are not fixed: they may be performed independently, since their fruit is their own and not the fruit of the rite.

The passageThe meditations on prāṇa in the Vājasaneyaka.

The questionAre the meditations on prāṇa as the chief and on the deities distinct?

ConclusionThey are distinct meditations, distinguished by their objects.

The passageThe fire-altars of mind, speech and the rest in the Agnirahasya of the Vājasaneyins.

The questionAre these mental altars part of the sacrificial performance, or meditations standing on their own?

ConclusionBādarāyaṇa holds them independent meditations: the preponderance of indicatory marks shows that they are conceived and not built, that they have their own fruit, and that they are open to those not performing the rite.

The passageThe materialist objection.

The questionIs there a self distinct from the body at all?

ConclusionThere is a self distinct from the body. Consciousness is not observed in the elements separately or in dead bodies otherwise similarly composed; memory and recognition require a persisting knower; and the body is an object of the self's awareness, not its subject.

The passageMeditations attached to members of a sacrifice.

The questionDo such meditations belong only to the recension in which they are recorded?

ConclusionThey apply across all recensions, since the sacrificial member is the same everywhere and the meditation attaches to the member.

The passageThe Vaiśvānara-vidyā and its parts.

The questionIs the meditation on the whole Vaiśvānara, or separately on heaven as the head, the sun as the eye, and so on?

ConclusionThe whole is to be meditated on, the parts serving only to build up the total conception. Meditation on a part alone yields a partial and inferior result.

The passageCriteria for distinguishing vidyās.

The questionWhat makes two meditations two?

ConclusionDifference of name, of form, of attribute or of fruit distinguishes meditations, as in the case of sacrifices.

The passageMeditations having the same fruit.

The questionIf several vidyās yield the same result, must all be practised?

ConclusionThey are alternatives; one may choose among them. Practising several is neither required nor forbidden.

The passageMeditations undertaken for particular desires.

The questionMust these too be treated as alternatives?

ConclusionThese may be combined at will, since their fruits are different and a person may seek several.

The passageMeditations connected with the members of sacrificial acts.

The questionDo these follow the acts they are attached to, or stand independently?

ConclusionThey follow the members to which they are attached, and their performance is regulated accordingly — but the fruit remains distinct. The pāda closes on this note of careful subordination.

The passageThe status of Self-knowledge in relation to ritual action.

The questionIs the knowledge of the Self an independent means to the highest end, or is it subordinate to sacrificial works?

ConclusionBādarāyaṇa's answer: knowledge is an independent means to the highest human end. Scripture teaches a Self that is not an agent and not an enjoyer, which is of no use to ritual; it declares the knower to have transcended the injunctions; and it promises immortality, which no act can produce, since every product is impermanent. The śruti's own statement is decisive — the knower ‘crosses over both’, the thought that he did wrong and the thought that he did right.

The passageThe scriptural standing of renunciation.

The questionIs sannyāsa actually enjoined by śruti, or merely mentioned?

ConclusionBādarāyaṇa holds that the āśramas are enjoined, renunciation among them, since scripture states them and the choice among them.

The passagePassages such as ‘the Udgītha is the best of essences’.

The questionAre these merely praise attached to a rite, or injunctions of meditation?

ConclusionThey enjoin meditations, since they teach something new and are followed by statements of fruit. Mere praise would add nothing.

The passageThe narratives of Yājñavalkya, Pratardana and the rest.

The questionAre these stories part of the pāriplava recitation of the horse sacrifice?

ConclusionThey are not; specific narratives are prescribed for that recitation. These serve to introduce and illuminate the teaching, drawing the mind toward the vidyā.

The passageThe knower and the fire-ritual.

The questionMust one who seeks knowledge maintain the sacrificial fires?

ConclusionThose who have gone beyond the āśramas of ritual are exempt, since scripture describes such knowers as maintaining no fires and performing no rites.

The passageThe usefulness of works to the seeker.

The questionIf knowledge alone liberates, are works of any use at all?

ConclusionThey are required as means to the rise of knowledge — sacrifice, gifts, austerity, and above all śama, dama, titikṣā and the rest. Works purify; they do not liberate. The distinction is between what conduces to knowledge and what constitutes it.

The passageChāndogya 5.2.1 — ‘for one who knows thus, there is nothing that is not food’.

The questionDoes the knower of prāṇa become free to eat anything?

ConclusionThe permission holds only where life is at stake, as the story of Cākrāyaṇa Uṣasti shows. The general rules of purity and prohibition remain in force, since scripture elsewhere enjoins them and no text abrogates them.

The passageThe duties of one's station.

The questionMust the seeker of knowledge continue to perform the duties of his āśrama?

ConclusionThe duties are to be performed, since scripture enjoins them on all who are in an āśrama and since they conduce to the purification in which knowledge arises. They are performed as means, not for their fruits.

The passageThose between stations — widowers, the destitute, those unable to maintain an āśrama.

The questionAre those outside the āśramas entitled to knowledge?

ConclusionThey are entitled. Scripture records knowers who belonged to no stage — Raikva with his cart, Gārgī — and the marks of knowledge are found in them. Their means are those available to them: prayer, restraint, service.

The passageThe one who has renounced.

The questionMay a sannyāsin return to a former stage?

ConclusionHe may not. Renunciation is not a stage among stages in that sense, and there is no return from it.

The passageThe lapsed renunciant.

The questionIs there expiation for one who breaks the vow of renunciation?

ConclusionThe authorities differ; the sūtras record the dispute. On the stricter view the lapse is not expiable, the vow being lifelong and unconditional.

The passageThe standing of such a person.

The questionIs the lapsed renunciant to be received back into society?

ConclusionHe is excluded, on the stricter view, from ritual society; the smṛtis treat the case severely.

The passageMeditations connected with sacrificial acts.

The questionWhose duty is such a meditation — the sacrificer's, or the officiating priest's?

ConclusionThe sacrificer's, since the fruit accrues to him; the priest performs the act for hire. Some such meditations are prescribed inside the ritual, others outside it.

The passageBṛhadāraṇyaka 3.5.1 — ‘let him, having risen above learning, live as a child; having risen above both learning and childlikeness, become silent’.

The questionIs <i>bālya</i> — childlikeness — enjoined, and what does it mean?

ConclusionIt is enjoined alongside paṇḍitya and mauna as a further means. Bālya means the innocence and absence of display natural to a child — not childishness, but the freedom from self-presentation that learning tends to produce and that must in turn be transcended.

The passageThe knower's manner of living.

The questionShould the knower make his state known?

ConclusionHe should not display it. The conduct enjoined is unobtrusive, and the knower gives no external sign of what he is.

The passageThe timing of the rise of knowledge.

The questionDoes knowledge necessarily arise in the life in which the means are practised?

ConclusionIt arises in this life or in a later one, according to whether obstacles are present. Effort is never lost; it may simply not fructify yet.

The passageThe uniformity of the result.

The questionAre there degrees of liberation, corresponding to degrees of knowledge or of practice?

ConclusionThere is no variety in liberation. It is one and uniform, being the state of Brahman itself, which admits of no gradations. Differences of fruit belong to the meditations that fall short of it.